[ISN] White House Critical Infrastructure Protection Paper (long)

Forwarded From: Nicholas Charles Brawn <ncb05@uow.edu.au>

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Date: Thu, 28 May 1998 15:09:17 -0400
From: Frans Mulschlegel <Mulschlegel_FJ@compuserve.com>
To: Blind.Copy.Receiver@compuserve.com
Subject: 27May98 USA: THE WHITE HOUSE - WHITE PAPER.

27May98 USA: THE WHITE HOUSE - WHITE PAPER.
RDATE:220598

The Clinton Administration's Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Presidential Decision Directive 63 May 22, 1998
This White Paper explains key elements of the Clinton Administration's
policy on critical infrastructure protection. It is intended for
dissemination to all interested parties in both the private and public
sectors. It will also be used in U.S. Government professional education
institutions, such as the National Defense University and the National
Foreign Affairs Training Center, for coursework and exercises on
interagency practices and procedures. Wide dissemination of this
unclassified White Paper is encouraged by all agencies of the U.S.
Government.
I. A Growing Potential Vulnerability
The United States possesses both the world's strongest military and its
largest national economy. Those two aspects of our power are mutually
reinforcing and dependent. They are also increasingly reliant upon certain
critical infrastructures and upon cyber-based information systems.
Critical infrastructures are those physical and cyber-based systems
essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government. They
include, but are not limited to, telecommunications, energy, banking and
finance, transportation, water systems and emergency services, both
governmental and private. Many of the nation's critical infrastructures
have historically been physically and logically separate systems that had
little interdependence. As a result of advances in information technology
and the necessity of improved efficiency, however, these infrastructures
have become increasingly automated and interlinked. These same advances
have created new vulnerabilities to equipment failures, human error,
weather and other natural causes, and physical and cyber attacks.
Addressing these vulnerabilities will necessarily require flexible,
evolutionary approaches that span both the public and private sectors, and
protect both domestic and international security.
Because of our military strength, future enemies, whether nations, groups
or individuals, may seek to harm us in non-traditional ways including
attacks within the United States. Our economy is increasingly reliant upon
interdependent and cyber-supported infrastructures and non-traditional
attacks on our infrastructure and information systems may be capable of
significantly harming both our military power and our economy.
II. President's Intent
It has long been the policy of the United States to assure the continuity
and viability of critical infrastructures. President Clinton intends that
the United States will take all necessary measures to swiftly eliminate any
significant vulnerability to both physical and cyber attacks on our
critical infrastructures, including especially our cyber systems.
III. A National Goal
No later than the year 2000, the United States shall have achieved an
initial operating capability and no later than five years from the day the
President signed Presidential Decision Directive 63 the United States shall
have achieved and shall maintain the ability to protect our nation's
critical infrastructures from intentional acts that would significantly
diminish the abilities of:
the Federal Government to perform essential national security missions and
to ensure the general public health and safety;
state and local governments to maintain order and to deliver minimum
essential public services;
the private sector to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy and the
delivery of essential telecommunications, energy, financial and
transportation services.
Any interruptions or manipulations of these critical functions must be
brief, infrequent, manageable, geographically isolated and minimally
detrimental to the welfare of the United States.
IV. A Public-Private Partnership to Reduce Vulnerability
Since the targets of attacks on our critical infrastructure would likely
include both facilities in the economy and those in the government, the
elimination of our potential vulnerability requires a closely coordinated
effort of both the public and the private sector. To succeed, this
partnership must be genuine, mutual and cooperative. In seeking to meet our
national goal to eliminate the vulnerabilities of our critical
infrastructure, therefore, the U.S. government should, to the extent
feasible, seek to avoid outcomes that increase government regulation or
expand unfunded government mandates to the private sector.
For each of the major sectors of our economy that are vulnerable to
infrastructure attack, the Federal Government will appoint from a
designated Lead Agency a senior officer of that agency as the Sector
Liaison Official to work with the private sector. Sector Liaison Officials,
after discussions and coordination with private sector entities of their
infrastructure sector, will identify a private sector counterpart (Sector
Coordinator) to represent their sector.
Together these two individuals and the departments and corporations they
represent shall contribute to a sectoral National Infrastructure Assurance
Plan by:
assessing the vulnerabilities of the sector to cyber or physical attacks;
recommending a plan to eliminate significant vulnerabilities;
proposing a system for identifying and preventing attempted major attacks;
developing a plan for alerting, containing and rebuffing an attack in
progress and then, in coordination with FEMA as appropriate, rapidly
reconstituting minimum essential capabilities in the aftermath of an
attack.
During the preparation of the sectoral plans, the National Coordinator (see
section VI), in conjunction with the Lead Agency Sector Liaison Officials
and a representative from the National Economic Council, shall ensure their
overall coordination and the integration of the various sectoral plans,
with a particular focus on interdependencies.
V. Guidelines
In addressing this potential vulnerability and the means of eliminating it,
President Clinton wants those involved to be mindful of the following
general principles and concerns.
We shall consult with, and seek input from, the Congress on approaches and
programs to meet the objectives set forth in this directive.
The protection of our critical infrastructures is necessarily a shared
responsibility and partnership between owners, operators and the
government. Furthermore, the Federal Government shall encourage
international cooperation to help manage this increasingly global problem.
Frequent assessments shall be made of our critical infrastructures'
existing reliability, vulnerability and threat environment because, as
technology and the nature of the threats to our critical infrastructures
will continue to change rapidly, so must our protective measures and
responses be robustly adaptive.
The incentives that the market provides are the first choice for addressing
the problem of critical infrastructure protection; regulation will be used
only in the face of a material failure of the market to protect the health,
safety or well-being of the American people. In such cases, agencies shall
identify and assess available alternatives to direct regulation, including
providing economic incentives to encourage the desired behavior, or
providing information upon which choices can be made by the private sector.
These incentives, along with other actions, shall be designed to help
harness the latest technologies, bring about global solutions to
international problems, and enable private sector owners and operators to
achieve and maintain the maximum feasible security.
The full authorities, capabilities and resources of the government,
including law enforcement, regulation, foreign intelligence and defense
preparedness shall be available, as appropriate, to ensure that critical
infrastructure protection is achieved and maintained.
Care must be taken to respect privacy rights. Consumers and operators must
have confidence that information will be handled accurately, confidentially
and reliably.
The Federal Government shall, through its research, development and
procurement, encourage the introduction of increasingly capable methods of
infrastructure protection.
The Federal Government shall serve as a model to the private sector on how
infrastructure assurance is best achieved and shall, to the extent
feasible, distribute the results of its endeavors.
We must focus on preventative measures as well as threat and crisis
management. To that end, private sector owners and operators should be
encouraged to provide maximum feasible security for the infrastructures
they control and to provide the government necessary information to assist
them in that task. In order to engage the private sector fully, it is
preferred that participation by owners and operators in a national
infrastructure protection system be voluntary.
Close cooperation and coordination with state and local governments and
first responders is essential for a robust and flexible infrastructure
protection program. All critical infrastructure protection plans and
actions shall take into consideration the needs, activities and
responsibilities of state and local governments and first responders.
VI. Structure and Organization
The Federal Government will be organized for the purposes of this endeavor
around four components (elaborated in Annex A).
Lead Agencies for Sector Liaison: For each infrastructure sector that could
be a target for significant cyber or physical attacks, there will be a
single U.S. Government department which will serve as the lead agency for
liaison. Each Lead Agency will designate one individual of Assistant
Secretary rank or higher to be the Sector Liaison Official for that area
and to cooperate with the private sector representatives (Sector
Coordinators) in addressing problems related to critical infrastructure
protection and, in particular, in recommending components of the National
Infrastructure Assurance Plan. Together, the Lead Agency and the private
sector counterparts will develop and implement a Vulnerability Awareness
and Education Program for their sector.
Lead Agencies for Special Functions: There are, in addition, certain
functions related to critical infrastructure protection that must be
chiefly performed by the Federal Government (national defense, foreign
affairs, intelligence, law enforcement). For each of those special
functions, there shall be a Lead Agency which will be responsible for
coordinating all of the activities of the United States Government in that
area. Each lead agency will appoint a senior officer of Assistant Secretary
rank or higher to serve as the Functional Coordinator for that function for
the Federal Government.
Interagency Coordination: The Sector Liaison Officials and Functional
Coordinators of the Lead Agencies, as well as representatives from other
relevant departments and agencies, including the National Economic Council,
will meet to coordinate the implementation of this directive under the
auspices of a Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group (CICG), chaired by
the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and
Counter-Terrorism. The National Coordinator will be appointed by and report
to the President through the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, who shall assure appropriate coordination with the
Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs. Agency representatives to
the CICG should be at a senior policy level (Assistant Secretary or
higher). Where appropriate, the CICG will be assisted by extant policy
structures, such as the Security Policy Board, Security Policy Forum and
the National Security and Telecommunications and Information System
Security Committee.
National Infrastructure Assurance Council: On the recommendation of the
Lead Agencies, the National Economic Council and the National Coordinator,
the President will appoint a panel of major infrastructure providers and
state and local government officials to serve as the National
Infrastructure Assurance Council. The President will appoint the Chairman.
The National Coordinator will serve as the Council's Executive Director.
The National Infrastructure Assurance Council will meet periodically to
enhance the partnership of the public and private sectors in protecting our
critical infrastructures and will provide reports to the President as
appropriate. Senior Federal Government officials will participate in the
meetings of the National Infrastructure Assurance Council as appropriate.
VII. Protecting Federal Government Critical Infrastructures
Every department and agency of the Federal Government shall be responsible
for protecting its own critical infrastructure, especially its cyber-based
systems. Every department and agency Chief Information Officer (CIO) shall
be responsible for information assurance. Every department and agency shall
appoint a Chief Infrastructure Assurance Officer (CIAO) who shall be
responsible for the protection of all of the other aspects of that
department's critical infrastructure. The CIO may be double-hatted as the
CIAO at the discretion of the individual department. These officials shall
establish procedures for obtaining expedient and valid authorizations to
allow vulnerability assessments to be performed on government computer and
physical systems. The Department of Justice shall establish legal
guidelines for providing for such authorizations.
No later than 180 days from issuance of this directive, every department
and agency shall develop a plan for protecting its own critical
infrastructure, including but not limited to its cyber-based systems. The
National Coordinator shall be responsible for coordinating analyses
required by the departments and agencies of inter-governmental dependencies
and the mitigation of those dependencies. The Critical Infrastructure
Coordination Group (CICG) shall sponsor an expert review process for those
plans. No later than two years from today, those plans shall have been
implemented and shall be updated every two years. In meeting this schedule,
the Federal Government shall present a model to the private sector on how
best to protect critical infrastructure.
VIII. Tasks
Within 180 days, the Principals Committee should submit to the President a
schedule for completion of a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan with
milestones for accomplishing the following subordinate and related tasks.
Vulnerability Analyses: For each sector of the economy and each sector of
the government that might be a target of infrastructure attack intended to
significantly damage the United States, there shall be an initial
vulnerability assessment, followed by periodic updates. As appropriate,
these assessments shall also include the determination of the minimum
essential infrastructure in each sector.
Remedial Plan: Based upon the vulnerability assessment, there shall be a
recommended remedial plan. The plan shall identify timelines for
implementation, responsibilities and funding.
Warning: A national center to warn of significant infrastructure attacks
will be established immediately (see Annex A). As soon thereafter as
possible, we will put in place an enhanced system for detecting and
analyzing such attacks, with maximum possible participation of the private
sector.
Response: A system for responding to a significant infrastructure attack
while it is underway, with the goal of isolating and minimizing damage.
Reconstitution: For varying levels of successful infrastructure attacks, we
shall have a system to reconstitute minimum required capabilities rapidly.
Education and Awareness: There shall be Vulnerability Awareness and
Education Programs within both the government and the private sector to
sensitize people regarding the importance of security and to train them in
security standards, particularly regarding cyber systems.
Research and Development: Federally-sponsored research and development in
support of infrastructure protection shall be coordinated, be subject to
multi-year planning, take into account private sector research, and be
adequately funded to minimize our vulnerabilities on a rapid but achievable
timetable.
Intelligence: The Intelligence Community shall develop and implement a plan
for enhancing collection and analysis of the foreign threat to our national
infrastructure, to include but not be limited to the foreign
cyber/information warfare threat.
International Cooperation: There shall be a plan to expand cooperation on
critical infrastructure protection with like-minded and friendly nations,
international organizations and multinational corporations.
Legislative and Budgetary Requirements: There shall be an evaluation of the
executive branch's legislative authorities and budgetary priorities
regarding critical infrastructure, and ameliorative recommendations shall
be made to the President as necessary. The evaluations and recommendations,
if any, shall be coordinated with the Director of OMB.
The CICG shall also review and schedule the taskings listed in Annex B.
IX. Implementation
In addition to the 180-day report, the National Coordinator, working with
the National Economic Council, shall provide an annual report on the
implementation of this directive to the President and the heads of
departments and agencies, through the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. The report should include an updated threat
assessment, a status report on achieving the milestones identified for the
National Plan and additional policy, legislative and budgetary
recommendations. The evaluations and recommendations, if any, shall be
coordinated with the Director of OMB. In addition, following the
establishment of an initial operating capability in the year 2000, the
National Coordinator shall conduct a zero-based review.
Annex A: Structure and Organization
Lead Agencies: Clear accountability within the U.S. Government must be
designated for specific sectors and functions. The following assignments of
responsibility will apply.
Lead Agencies for Sector Liaison:
Commerce Information and communications
Treasury Banking and finance
EPA Water supply
Transportation Aviation Highways (including trucking and intelligent
transportation systems) Mass transit Pipelines Rail Waterborne commerce
Justice/FBI Emergency law enforcement services
FEMA Emergency fire service Continuity of government services
HHS Public health services, including prevention, surveillance, laboratory
services and personal health services
Energy Electric power Oil and gas production and storage
Lead Agencies for Special Functions:
Justice/FBI Law enforcement and internal security
CIA Foreign intelligence
State Foreign affairs
Defense National defense
In addition, OSTP shall be responsible for coordinating research and
development agendas and programs for the government through the National
Science and Technology Council. Furthermore, while Commerce is the lead
agency for information and communication, the Department of Defense will
retain its Executive Agent responsibilities for the National Communications
System and support of the President's National Security Telecommunications
Advisory Committee.
National Coordinator: The National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure
Protection and Counter-Terrorism shall be responsible for coordinating the
implementation of this directive. The National Coordinator will report to
the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs. The National Coordinator will also participate as a full member of
Deputies or Principals Committee meetings when they meet to consider
infrastructure issues. Although the National Coordinator will not direct
Departments and Agencies, he or she will ensure interagency coordination
for policy development and implementation, and will review crisis
activities concerning infrastructure events with significant foreign
involvement. The National Coordinator will provide advice, in the context
of the established annual budget process, regarding agency budgets for
critical infrastructure protection. The National Coordinator will chair the
Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group (CICG), reporting to the
Deputies Committee (or, at the call of its chair, the Principals
Committee). The Sector Liaison Officials and Special Function Coordinators
shall attend the CICG's meetings. Departments and agencies shall each
appoint to the CICG a senior official (Assistant Secretary level or higher)
who will regularly attend its meetings. The National Security Advisor shall
appoint a Senior Director for Infrastructure Protection on the NSC staff.
A National Plan Coordination (NPC) staff will be contributed on a
non-reimbursable basis by the departments and agencies, consistent with
law. The NPC staff will integrate the various sector plans into a National
Infrastructure Assurance Plan and coordinate analyses of the U.S.
Government's own dependencies on critical infrastructures. The NPC staff
will also help coordinate a national education and awareness program, and
legislative and public affairs.
The Defense Department shall continue to serve as Executive Agent for the
Commission Transition Office, which will form the basis of the NPC, during
the remainder of FY98. Beginning in FY99, the NPC shall be an office of the
Commerce Department. The Office of Personnel Management shall provide the
necessary assistance in facilitating the NPC's operations. The NPC will
terminate at the end of FY01, unless extended by Presidential directive.
Warning and Information Centers
As part of a national warning and information sharing system, the President
immediately authorizes the FBI to expand its current organization to a full
scale National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). This organization
shall serve as a national critical infrastructure threat assessment,
warning, vulnerability, and law enforcement investigation and response
entity. During the initial period of six to twelve months, the President
also directs the National Coordinator and the Sector Liaison Officials,
working together with the Sector Coordinators, the Special Function
Coordinators and representatives from the National Economic Council, as
appropriate, to consult with owners and operators of the critical
infrastructures to encourage the creation of a private sector sharing and
analysis center, as described below.
National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC): The NIPC will include
FBI, USSS, and other investigators experienced in computer crimes and
infrastructure protection, as well as representatives detailed from the
Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community and Lead Agencies. It
will be linked electronically to the rest of the Federal Government,
including other warning and operations centers, as well as any private
sector sharing and analysis centers. Its mission will include providing
timely warnings of intentional threats, comprehensive analyses and law
enforcement investigation and response.
All executive departments and agencies shall cooperate with the NIPC and
provide such assistance, information and advice that the NIPC may request,
to the extent permitted by law. All executive departments shall also share
with the NIPC information about threats and warning of attacks and about
actual attacks on critical government and private sector infrastructures,
to the extent permitted by law. The NIPC will include elements responsible
for warning, analysis, computer investigation, coordinating emergency
response, training, outreach and development and application of technical
tools. In addition, it will establish its own relations directly with
others in the private sector and with any information sharing and analysis
entity that the private sector may create, such as the Information Sharing
and Analysis Center described below.
The NIPC, in conjunction with the information originating agency, will
sanitize law enforcement and intelligence information for inclusion into
analyses and reports that it will provide, in appropriate form, to relevant
federal, state and local agencies; the relevant owners and operators of
critical infrastructures; and to any private sector information sharing and
analysis entity. Before disseminating national security or other
information that originated from the intelligence community, the NIPC will
coordinate fully with the intelligence community through existing
procedures. Whether as sanitized or unsanitized reports, the NIPC will
issue attack warnings or alerts to increases in threat condition to any
private sector information sharing and analysis entity and to the owners
and operators. These warnings may also include guidance regarding
additional protection measures to be taken by owners and operators. Except
in extreme emergencies, the NIPC shall coordinate with the National
Coordinator before issuing public warnings of imminent attacks by
international terrorists, foreign states or other malevolent foreign
powers.
The NIPC will provide a national focal point for gathering information on
threats to the infrastructures. Additionally, the NIPC will provide the
principal means of facilitating and coordinating the Federal Government's
response to an incident, mitigating attacks, investigating threats and
monitoring reconstitution efforts. Depending on the nature and level of a
foreign threat/attack, protocols established between special function
agencies (DOJ/DOD/CIA), and the ultimate decision of the President, the
NIPC may be placed in a direct support role to either DOD or the
Intelligence Community.
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC): The National Coordinator,
working with Sector Coordinators, Sector Liaison Officials and the National
Economic Council, shall consult with owners and operators of the critical
infrastructures to strongly encourage the creation of a private sector
information sharing and analysis center. The actual design and functions of
the center and its relation to the NIPC will be determined by the private
sector, in consultation with and with assistance from the Federal
Government. Within 180 days of this directive, the National Coordinator,
with the assistance of the CICG including the National Economic Council,
shall identify possible methods of providing federal assistance to
facilitate the startup of an ISAC.
Such a center could serve as the mechanism for gathering, analyzing,
appropriately sanitizing and disseminating private sector information to
both industry and the NIPC. The center could also gather, analyze and
disseminate information from the NIPC for further distribution to the
private sector. While crucial to a successful government-industry
partnership, this mechanism for sharing important information about
vulnerabilities, threats, intrusions and anomalies is not to interfere with
direct information exchanges between companies and the government.
As ultimately designed by private sector representatives, the ISAC may
emulate particular aspects of such institutions as the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention that have proved highly effective, particularly its
extensive interchanges with the private and non-federal sectors. Under such
a model, the ISAC would possess a large degree of technical focus and
expertise and non-regulatory and non-law enforcement missions. It would
establish baseline statistics and patterns on the various infrastructures,
become a clearinghouse for information within and among the various
sectors, and provide a library for historical data to be used by the
private sector and, as deemed appropriate by the ISAC, by the government.
Critical to the success of such an institution would be its timeliness,
accessibility, coordination, flexibility, utility and acceptability.
Annex B: Additional Taskings
Studies
The National Coordinator shall commission studies on the following
subjects:
Liability issues arising from participation by private sector companies in
the information sharing process.
Existing legal impediments to information sharing, with an eye to proposals
to remove these impediments, including through the drafting of model codes
in cooperation with the American Legal Institute.
The necessity of document and information classification and the impact of
such classification on useful dissemination, as well as the methods and
information systems by which threat and vulnerability information can be
shared securely while avoiding disclosure or unacceptable risk of
disclosure to those who will misuse it.
The improved protection, including secure dissemination and information
handling systems, of industry trade secrets and other confidential business
data, law enforcement information and evidentiary material, classified
national security information, unclassified material disclosing
vulnerabilities of privately owned infrastructures and apparently innocuous
information that, in the aggregate, it is unwise to disclose.
The implications of sharing information with foreign entities where such
sharing is deemed necessary to the security of United States
infrastructures.
The potential benefit to security standards of mandating, subsidizing, or
otherwise assisting in the provision of insurance for selected critical
infrastructure providers and requiring insurance tie-ins for foreign
critical infrastructure providers hoping to do business with the United
States.
Public Outreach
In order to foster a climate of enhanced public sensitivity to the problem
of infrastructure protection, the following actions shall be taken:
The White House, under the oversight of the National Coordinator, together
with the relevant Cabinet agencies shall consider a series of conferences:
(1) that will bring together national leaders in the public and private
sectors to propose programs to increase the commitment to information
security; (2) that convoke academic leaders from engineering, computer
science, business and law schools to review the status of education in
information security and will identify changes in the curricula and
resources necessary to meet the national demand for professionals in this
field; (3) on the issues around computer ethics as these relate to the K
through 12 and general university populations.
The National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering
shall consider a round table bringing together federal, state and local
officials with industry and academic leaders to develop national strategies
for enhancing infrastructure security.
The intelligence community and law enforcement shall expand existing
programs for briefing infrastructure owners and operators and senior
government officials.
The National Coordinator shall (1) establish a program for infrastructure
assurance simulations involving senior public and private officials, the
reports of which might be distributed as part of an awareness campaign; and
(2) in coordination with the private sector, launch a continuing national
awareness campaign, emphasizing improving infrastructure security.
Internal Federal Government Actions
In order for the Federal Government to improve its infrastructure security,
these immediate steps shall be taken:
The Department of Commerce, the General Services Administration, and the
Department of Defense shall assist federal agencies in the implementation
of best practices for information assurance within their individual
agencies.
The National Coordinator shall coordinate a review of existing federal,
state and local bodies charged with information assurance tasks, and
provide recommendations on how these institutions can cooperate most
effectively.
All federal agencies shall make clear designations regarding who may
authorize access to their computer systems.
The Intelligence Community shall elevate and formalize the priority for
enhanced collection and analysis of information on the foreign
cyber/information warfare threat to our critical infrastructure.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service and other
appropriate agencies shall: (1) vigorously recruit undergraduate and
graduate students with the relevant computer-related technical skills for
full-time employment as well as for part-time work with regional computer
crime squads; and (2) facilitate the hiring and retention of qualified
personnel for technical analysis and investigation involving cyber attacks.
The Department of Transportation, in consultation with the Department of
Defense, shall undertake a thorough evaluation of the vulnerability of the
national transportation infrastructure that relies on the Global
Positioning System. This evaluation shall include sponsoring an
independent, integrated assessment of risks to civilian users of GPS-based
systems, with a view to basing decisions on the ultimate architecture of
the modernized NAS on these evaluations.
The Federal Aviation Administration shall develop and implement a
comprehensive National Airspace System Security Program to protect the
modernized NAS from information-based and other disruptions and attacks.
GSA shall identify large procurements (such as the new Federal
Telecommunications System, FTS 2000) related to infrastructure assurance,
study whether the procurement process reflects the importance of
infrastructure protection and propose, if necessary, revisions to the
overall procurement process to do so.
OMB shall direct federal agencies to include assigned infrastructure
assurance functions within their Government Performance and Results Act
strategic planning and performance measurement framework.
The NSA, in accordance with its National Manager responsibilities in
NSD-42, shall provide assessments encompassing examinations of U.S.
Government systems to interception and exploitation; disseminate threat and
vulnerability information; establish standards; conduct research and
development; and conduct issue security product evaluations.
Assisting the Private Sector
In order to assist the private sector in achieving and maintaining
infrastructure security:
The National Coordinator and the National Infrastructure Assurance Council
shall propose and develop ways to encourage private industry to perform
periodic risk assessments of critical processes, including information and
telecommunications systems.
The Department of Commerce and the Department of Defense shall work
together, in coordination with the private sector, to offer their expertise
to private owners and operators of critical infrastructure to develop
security-related best practice standards.
The Department of Justice and Department of the Treasury shall sponsor a
comprehensive study compiling demographics of computer crime, comparing
state approaches to computer crime and developing ways of deterring and
responding to computer crime by juveniles.


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